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ABSTRACT 
The possibility of knowledge attributions across contexts (where attributor and subject 
find themselves in different epistemic contexts) can create serious problems for certain 
views of knowledge. Amongst such views is subject—sensitive invariantism—the view 
that knowledge is determined not only by epistemic factors (belief, truth, evidence, etc.) 
but also by non—epistemic factors (practical interests, etc.). I argue that subject—
sensitive invariantism either runs into a contradiction or has to make very implausible 
assumptions. The problem has been very much neglected but is so serious that one 
should look for alternative accounts of knowledge. 
 
1. The Problem: A Contradiction for SSI 
Hawthorne and Stanley are on a train, in different coaches. They both independently 
wonder whether the train will stop at T—town. A lot depends on it for Stanley but 
nothing for Hawthorne. They look up the reliable schedule which says, correctly, that the 
train does stop at T—town. Can they thus come to know that the train will stop at T—
town?1 
According to subject—sensitive invariantism (SSI), knowledge does not only 
depend on the epistemic situation of the subject (true belief, warrant) but also on their 
                                                
1 See Fantl and McGrath 2002, 67—68, and 2009. 
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non—epistemic situation, especially their practical interests.2 If the practical stakes (for 
a person at a time) go up or down, they drive the standards for knowledge up or down. 
In high—stakes situations it is harder to know a given proposition than in low—stakes 
situations. It can happen that one and the same proposition is known by a subject in a 
low—stakes situation and not known by a subject in a high—stakes situation, even if the 
two subjects do not differ with respect to the relevant epistemic factors (evidence, etc.).3 
According to SSI, Hawthorne might well come to know (by trusting the schedule) 
that the train will stop at T—town whereas Stanley would probably not come to know 
that (until he checks further sources, asks the conductor, etc.; let us assume for the 
sake of the example that only very special, direct perceptual evidence would constitute 
warrant sufficient for knowledge). Suppose Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at 
T—town whereas Stanley doesn’t. Also suppose that Stanley hears from another 
passenger passing through his coach that reliable Hawthorne carefully examined the 
schedule and came to the conclusion that the train will stop at T—town; “Hawthorne 
knows that the train will stop at T—town,” the passenger tells Stanley. Let us add further 
that Stanley also adheres to SSI. Can he, after correctly evaluating their situation, 
                                                
2 See Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005; Fantl and McGrath 2009 
3 Strictly speaking, this is only one though a widely accepted version of SSI. The non—epistemic 
parameter need not be restricted to practical interests and the latter do not even have to be 
amongst the relevant non—epistemic factors. For the sake of simplicity, I will only consider the 
interest—relative version of SSI (also because it is the most widely discussed one). The 
arguments here also apply to other (e.g., salience—based; see Hawthorne 2004, ch.4) versions 
of SSI. I will also leave aside the non—trivial question as to what distinguishes epistemic from 
non—epistemic factors.  
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concede that whereas he himself doesn’t know that the train will stop at T—town, 
Hawthorne does? 
If yes, then SSI is in trouble.4 This problem has been neglected so far.5 Here is 
the problem. According to SSI, the following two things are true (given our little story): 
 
(1) Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town; 
 
(2) Stanley doesn’t know that (whether) the train will stop at T—town. 
 
Now, let us assume that Stanley, the adherent of SSI, does concede and even know 
(1). Can’t one person very often or normally know that another person knows a given 
proposition? This possibility seems so basic for our ordinary concept of knowledge that 
its denial would have to be supported by strong theoretical reasons against it (see much 
more on this below). Lacking such overriding reasons, we can allow for the possibility 
that and assume that 
                                                
4 Similar problems arise, more indirectly, for arguments supporting SSI, like, e.g., arguments from a 
close connection between knowledge and practical reasoning or action (see, e.g., Williamson 
2005, 231, and 2000, 47; Stanley 2005, 9—10; Hawthorne 2004, 29—30, 85, 174—175; 
Hawthorne and Stanley 2008; Fantl and McGrath 2009). I won’t go into this (but see Baumann 
2012) or other arguments for SSI here because they’re not relevant to my main point. 
5 But cf. the short passages in Wright 2005, 243—244; Brueckner 2005, 317; Hawthorne 2004, 
159—160; one of the very few papers on the topic is Brueckner and Buford 2009; see also 
Williamson 2005, sec.2 as well as Macfarlane 2005, Blaauw 2008, Brown 2014, 192—196, and 
Moeller 2015 on related problems concerning testimony and memory. On the analogous problem 
for contextualism see also Baumann 2008. 
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(3) Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town. 
 
Stanley further knows that 
 
(Factivity) For all subjects S and all propositions p: If S knows that p, then p.6 
 
Hence it is also true that (given that Stanley can apply (Factivity) to cases) 
 
(4) Stanley knows that if Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town, then it will 
stop at T—town. 
 
Given closure (or a basic form thereof)— 
 
(Closure—Basic) For all subjects S and all propositions p and q: If S knows that p and 
also knows that (p → q), then S knows that q7 
 
—we can infer from (3) and (4) that 
 
                                                
6 This holds with necessity. For the sake of simplicity, I will skip the necessity operator here and 
below in the case of this and other necessary principles. 
7 This is a simplified version of an acceptable principle of closure. One would have to add further 
whistles and bells, like the condition that the person competently deduces q from p and p → q. 
We can skip this and other such details here because they don’t matter for the main point here. 
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(5) Stanley knows that the train will stop at T—town. 
 
This, however, contradicts (2). Which assumption has to go?8 In the following I will lay 
out several possible strategies for the adherent of SSI to solve this problem (section 2). 
The following sections (3—5) argue against the one, initially promising strategy. I will 
also point out unwelcome implications of this defence of SSI (sections 6—7) and end by 
discussing a lost proposal to solve the problem for SSI (section 8). 
 
2. Denying Knowledge of Knowledge 
It seems very desperate to deny factivity. If anything does not satisfy the factivity 
condition, then it is not knowledge; factivity seems essential to and at least partly 
constitutive of knowledge. Apart from this, even if one were to give deniers of factivity 
some credibility, that denial wouldn’t help the defender of SSI much at all: They need an 
independent motivation for it which goes beyond the ad hoc reason that the denial of 
factivity would solve a problem for the theory. Rescuing an interesting epistemological 
                                                
8 All I am arguing for here is that SSI leads to contradictions not in all but only in some though 
important cases: when the stakes of the person who makes the relevant cross—context 
judgments are significantly higher than the stakes of the other subject. This is sufficient to get SSI 
into serious trouble. The problem presented here arises in a pure third—person form. There is no 
element of some irreducible first—person perspective that is doing any work in the exposition of 
the problem (no matter whether Stanley believes or knows that he is indeed Stanley). There is 
thus also no shift (legitimate or illicit) between first— and third—person perspectives involved 
here. Thanks to a referee for pressing me on this.  
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view by giving up on one of the least controversial basic assumptions about knowledge 
constitutes a very desperate move. 
But what about denying closure or at least a principle like (Closure—Basic) 
above? Such principles are, though accepted quite broadly, much less uncontroversial 
than the factivity assumption, and there have been prominent and very well—argued 
deniers of such principles.9 What reason then could one have to deny something like 
(Closure—Basic)? And what reasons of that kind would be relevant here? Dretske, for 
instance, argues that closure fails in cases where the conclusion of the relevant 
deduction (‘q’) constitutes a ‘heavyweight proposition’.10 Dretske is thinking of denials of 
sceptical scenarios (like, e.g., I am not currently being deceived by a Cartesian demon) 
when referring to heavyweight propositions. It seems obvious that a proposition like the 
one in (5) (that the train will stop at T—town) does not qualify as such a heavyweight 
proposition. There certainly are lightweight propositions in Dretske’s sense and the 
latter one belongs into this class. Hence, Dretske’s analysis doesn’t help us with our 
problem.  
Nozick also does not help us much in our search for independent non—ad—hoc 
reasons to give up the likes of (Closure—Basic). He states that such a principle is 
incompatible with his own account of knowledge11 but also adds an (astonishingly rarely 
discussed) diagnosis of closure failure. According to him, closure fails in cases where if 
the conclusion (‘q’) were false, the subject would still believe the premise (‘p’) and 
                                                
9 See Dretske 1970 and Nozick 1981, ch.3. 
10 See Dretske 2005, 16—17. 
11 See Nozick 1981, ch.3.I—II. 
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deduce the conclusion from it.12 If the train were not to stop at T—town (see (5)), 
Stanley might still believe that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town (see 
(3)) and infer that the train will stop at T—town. However, even if our case can be 
diagnosed by Nozick, his diagnosis still doesn’t offer us an independent reason (which 
would not be ad hoc) to deny (Closure—Basic) or anything like it. How could it? 
Does closure perhaps fail in cases where there is some kind of “transmission 
failure”?13 Here is what one could have in mind: Closure fails in cases where the 
conclusion (‘q’) is antecedently (to the inference) unknown by the subject but the 
subject’s knowledge that p requires that she presupposes and takes for granted that q. 
Whatever the details of such an idea, it is very hard to see in our case how Stanley’s 
knowledge of the premise (that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town) 
requires the presupposition of the antecedently unknown conclusion (that the train will 
stop at T—town) (see also section 5 below). Finally, one might propose that closure fails 
in cases where the premises are of low stakes (e.g., that Hawthorne knows that the 
train will stop at T—town) but the conclusion is of high stakes (e.g., that the train will 
stop at T—town). Such a move also seems poorly motivated and ad hoc (see also 
section 4 below).  
Let us then put both the denial of closure and the denial of factivity aside as 
potential strategies to solve our problem, without going further into these complex topics 
(I can, by the way, think of no defender of SSI who would be ready deny either of the 
                                                
12 See Nozick 1981, 231. 
13 See for this idea Wright 1985, 432—438, and Davies 1998, 351—355; however, both distinguish 
in principle between transmission failure and closure failure. 
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two). It would also be ad hoc to deny that Stanley can know some instance of the 
Factivity principle like the one in (4). Hence, we are left with (1), (2) and (3): that 
Hawthorne knows but Stanley doesn’t know that the train will stop at T—town, and that 
Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows it. (1) and (2) follow from SSI (given our case). 
What then about (3) (Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—
town) ? Couldn’t or shouldn’t Stanley or the adherent of SSI in a high—stakes situation 
deny that they know (1)?14 Stanley cannot know (1), so the argument goes, not because 
he doubts that Hawthorne has a warrant—based belief that the train will stop at T—
town. Rather, given the high stakes, he cannot commit himself to or accept p. He does 
not know p and does not take himself to know p. But given factivity and closure (see 
section 1 above) he would need to know p in order to know that Hawthorne knows it. To 
be sure, Stanley can accept the conditional If the train will stop at T—town, then 
Hawthorne knows that but this is neither here nor there because it doesn’t amount to 
the unconditional claim needed here: that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at 
T—town. 
Let us take a closer look at this point: How exactly would the argument against 
(3) (Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town) work? It 
certainly cannot be the following one: (5) (Stanley knows that the train will stop at T—
town) is false; (5) follows from (3), (4) (Stanley knows that if Hawthorne knows that the 
train will stop at T—town, then it will stop at T—town) and closure: hence the 
conjunction of (3), (4) and closure is false; since closure and (4) are beyond doubt here, 
(3) is false. In short: since Stanley does not know that p he cannot know that Hawthorne 
                                                
14 See Hawthorne 2004, 159—160 and Brueckner and Buford 2009. 
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knows that p (which together with plausible principles implies the former). This 
argument, however, would, as it stands, simply be question—begging and a case of 
ignoring the problem of inconsistency from the start; to resolve a contradiction like the 
one above (p and not—p), one certainly cannot reject p on the basis of not—p. And isn’t 
(3) independently plausible? I only mention this kind of weak argument because some 
people bring it up in discussion; therefore it is worth mentioning it, if only to get it out of 
the way.15 
What other ways of arguing against (3) are there? Unfortunately for SSI, there is 
(as we will see) no room for the denial of (3) or for the affirmation of 
 
(6) Stanley does not know that / whether Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—
town. 
 
How could (6) be true?  
Why shouldn't Stanley be able to come to acquire knowledge about Hawthorne's 
epistemic state (e.g., via testimony), especially if he happens not to care much about 
Hawthorne and his epistemic states? Doesn’t a theory which denies this basic 
possibility have to come up with strong reasons against it? Isn’t the burden of proof on 
the side of SSI here? SSIists will and should argue that Stanley is in a high—stakes 
situation with respect to Hawthorne’s epistemic situation concerning p because Stanley 
is in a high—stakes situation with respect to p; therefore Stanley cannot come to know 
that p (1). But couldn't Stanley be in a low—stakes situation with respect to Hawthorne's 
                                                
15 See also Brueckner and Buford 2009. 
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epistemic situation concerning p even if p is a high—stakes proposition for Stanley? I 
will argue step by step for a positive answer to this question. In section 3 I will start to 
raise doubts about the idea of a close connection between the stakes for p and the 
stakes for Kp; this section is of a preparatory nature. In sections 4 and 5 I will continue 
and discuss what are probably SSI’s defenders’ main arguments here. In sections 6 and 
7 I will discuss bad implications of all these defences of SSI while I briefly discuss a last 
proposal of a way out of the problem for SSI in section 8. 
 
3. First Failed Argument: P—Stakes and Kp—Stakes 
Certainly, the stakes regarding a given proposition can be different from the stakes 
regarding somebody else’s knowledge of that proposition. The following principle is 
false: 
 
(Hand—in—Hand) For all subjects A and S and all propositions p: A’s stakes regarding 
p are not significantly higher and not significantly lower than A’s stakes regarding S 
knows that p. 
 
A might not care at all whether Cairo is the capital of Egypt but care a lot whether S 
knows whether Cairo is the capital of Egypt, given that S is on a game show, would win 
a lot money with a correct answer to a question about Egypt’s capital and has promised 
to split all gains with A. So, someone’s stakes can be low regarding a given proposition 
but high when it comes to whether someone else knows that proposition.  
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One could object that in this case part of A’s concern whether S knows that p is 
the concern whether p (at least sometimes a concern for X involves a concern for some 
necessary condition Y of X). However, the focus of A’s concern in the case above is 
clearly on S’s epistemic situation with respect to the relevant fact; there is thus much 
less of a focus on the fact itself. A’s stakes are higher with respect to the former than 
with respect to the latter aspect of the situation (even if both are connected). Apart from 
that, it is not true for all necessary conditions Y of some given X that high stakes for X 
come with high stakes for Y: Even if Jack is coming to town is high stakes for Jill at t, it 
need not be high stakes at all for Jill whether someone is coming to town.  
The reverse case is much more interesting, controversial and relevant here: Can 
someone’s stakes be high regarding a given proposition but low when it comes to 
whether someone else knows that proposition? Can Stanley have high stakes regarding 
the train stops but low stakes regarding Hawthorne’s knowledge of it? The defender of 
SSI might reply that 
 
(Hand—in—Hand*) For all subjects A and S and all propositions p: A’s stakes regarding 
p are not significantly higher than A’s stakes regarding S knows that p. 
 
Suppose I care a lot whether my grandparent G died without pain. There is nothing I 
can do about it but my stakes are still high here: A death in pain would depress me quite 
a bit while a painless death would relieve me considerably. Are my stakes then for, say, 
G’s neighbour knew that G died with/ without pain as high (more or less)? I don’t think 
so. My concern is with the fact and not so much with my neighbour’s epistemic situation.  
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It might be harder to argue against (Hand—in—Hand*) when the subject is about 
to act on the relevant proposition. Here is an example including such a direct connection 
with action. I care a lot whether the mushrooms I am going to cook are of a certain 
(poisonous) kind. Are my stakes regarding Cambridge’s mushroom expert Dr. F knows 
that these mushrooms are / aren’t of a certain (poisonous) kind as high (more or less) 
as my stakes concerning These mushrooms are / aren’t of a certain (poisonous) kind? 
Assume in addition that Cambridge has 4 famous mushroom experts. Are the stakes 
regarding each of the following group then as high as regarding the original proposition: 
 
Dr. A knows that the mushrooms are / aren’t poisonous, 
Dr. C knows that the mushrooms are / aren’t poisonous, 
Dr. E knows that the mushrooms are / aren’t poisonous, 
Dr. F knows that the mushrooms are / aren’t poisonous, 
 
I doubt it. My concern is not with the question whether this or that expert knows that p; I 
am more concerned with the question whether someone knows that p and even more 
(much more) concerned with the question whether p.16  
                                                
16 One could propose to replace (Hand—in—Hand*) by (Hand—in—Hand**): For all subjects A and 
S and all propositions p: A’s stakes regarding p are not significantly higher than A’s stakes 
regarding Somebody knows that p. Perhaps the latter is more plausible than the former. 
However, I doubt that it is plausible enough here. I won’t go into this any further because this 
section is only supposed to raise some doubts about claims that stakes are connected a certain 
way.  
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If I am right and if (Hand—in—Hand*) is false, then it seems quite plausible to 
say that Stanley can come to know that Hawthorne knows that the train stops at T—
town even if Stanley does not know that the train will stop at T—town. According to 
SSI's own principles, we would then have to say that Stanley knows that Hawthorne 
knows – and accept the contradiction. However, as I said above, I don’t take this section 
to be anything but preparatory for what follows now. 
 
4. Second Failed Argument: Transmission of Stakes 
There is an argument against (3) (Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows that the train 
will stop at T—town) and the inconsistency claim which I have encountered quite often 
in discussion and which seems to capture the main point of resistance against the 
conclusion I am arguing for. Here it is, as applied to our original example. Stanley's 
stakes are high with respect to (1) (Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town) 
because he can deduce from (1) together with some other premise (Factivity) a 
proposition which is high—stakes for him, namely that the train will stop at T—town.17 
This thought suggests something like the following general principle as its basis (we can 
ignore details and possible variations here): 
 
                                                
17 See Stanley 2005, 93—94 for a hint in this direction; see also the related discussion of Neta 2007 
in Fantl and McGrath 2009, 201—207 and another round in Neta 2012, 459—460 and Fantl and 
McGrath 2012, 482—484; see also Montminy and Skolits 2014, 324 and in particular Howell 
2005. 
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(Inferential Stakes) For all subjects S and all propositions p, q and r: If p is a high—
stakes proposition for S and if S can deduce p from q (together with some r), then q is 
itself a high—stakes proposition for S. 
 
The defender of SSI will have to accept something along these lines. Just to mention 
another variation—a principle in terms of entailment rather than deducibility by S: 
 
(Entailed Stakes) For all subjects S and all propositions p, q and r: If p is a high—stakes 
proposition for S and if q (together with some r) entails p, then q is itself a high—stakes 
proposition for S. 
 
The problem is that such principles are incorrect. First of all – as already pointed 
out above—, stakes don’t transfer to necessary conditions automatically or in every 
case: so, low stakes for Kp don’t entail low stakes for p and not so low stakes for p don’t 
entail not so low stakes for Kp. Let us look more closely at the following three problems.  
Obviously (i), every proposition q entails some high—stakes proposition p if 
combined with certain other appropriate premises (whether of the form ‘If q then p’ or 
not). Hence, according to (Entailed Stakes) every proposition is a high—stakes 
proposition if some are. Since some are, every proposition is a high—stakes 
proposition. This, however, seems clearly false: Clearly, stakes differ from proposition to 
proposition (for a subject at a time). Defenders of SSI should try not to get into a 
situation where they have to deny this. A similar argument can (with slight modifications) 
be made against (Inferential Stakes)—but I won't go into this here to avoid repetitions.  
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Consider also (ii) an example involving a great number of premises from which a 
high—stakes conclusion can be inferred. Suppose a detective is working on some case. 
There are 1000 different propositions describing different pieces of evidence. Only 
taken together they do imply a proposition which is of high stakes for the detective 
(namely that the chauffeur did it). It is very implausible that a particular single, isolated 
piece of evidence as such (e.g., that the profile of the tires of the chauffeur's private car 
is medium) should count as being of high stakes for the detective. Again, similar things 
hold (mutatis mutandis) for (Entailed Stakes). 
Finally (iii), Stanley uses both (1) (Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—
town) and (Factivity) to infer the high—stakes (for him) proposition that the train will stop 
at T—town. If this makes (1) high—stakes, then presumably it also makes (Factivity) 
high—stakes. The latter, however, is very implausible. But then it seems arbitrary to say 
that (1) is high—stakes for Stanley—given that (Factivity) is not. Why should one 
premise be high—stakes and the other not? Even if one were to restrict (Inferential 
Stakes) and (Entailed Stakes) to a small number of (types of) premises, one would still 
have to explain which propositions would be high—stakes given that they help infer or 
entail a high—stakes proposition and which propositions wouldn’t be high—stakes for 
that reason. There are serious doubts that this can be done in any non—arbitrary way. 
SSIists have, as far as I can see, not even begun to try to do this. As long as this is the 
case, we should reject the likes of (Inferential Stakes) and (Entailed Stakes) and not bet 
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much on them. They don’t give any plausible support to (6) and won’t help against the 
inconsistency claim.18 
 
5. Third Failed Argument: Independent and Prior Knowledge 
There is another move the defender of SSI could make when arguing for (6) (Stanley 
does not know that / whether Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town): 
adding further necessary conditions for knowing that someone else knows that p. What 
Stanley apparently needs for knowledge that S knows that p is prior, independent 
knowledge that p, that is, knowledge that p which is not based on the knowledge that S 
knows that p; Stanley needs to base his knowledge of (1) (Hawthorne knows that the 
train will stop at T—town) on his knowledge of The train will stop at T—town. However, 
this kind of independent, prior knowledge of The train will stop at T—town Stanley does 
not have in his high—stakes situation. This is why Stanley does not have knowledge of 
(1). 
However, there is a serious problem with this move: It presupposes a principle 
like the following one: 
 
                                                
18 If principles like (Inferential Stakes) or (Entailed Stakes) are false, and if in general degrees of 
stakes are not closed under known entailment, then one might wonder how the defender of SSI 
can hold on to a principle of closure for knowledge (which would be particularly interesting given 
the problems with giving up closure mentioned above, at the beginning of section 2). See Stanley 
2005, 93—94 here but also Fantl 2015, 41—42. This is not our concern here. 
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(Independent Knowledge) For all subjects A and B and all propositions p: If A knows 
that B knows that p, then A knows that p where the latter knowledge is prior to and 
independent from (not based on) the knowledge that B knows that p. 
 
However, (Independent Knowledge) is not plausible.19 Consider a case of testimony. A 
reliable and trustworthy informant tells the mathematical lay person Jack that Wiles 
knows that Fermat was right. It seems that Jack thus acquires knowledge that Wiles 
knows that Fermat was right even if Jack has no independent and prior knowledge that 
Fermat was right. Why then should Stanley not also acquire testimonial knowledge that 
Hawthorne knows that p (e.g., from an omniscient God who also believes in SSI or from 
some fellow SSIist how has much better evidence available both about the train 
schedule and Hawthorne’s epistemic situation) without having any independent 
knowledge of p himself? It would be a bad idea to reply dogmatically here that 
(Independent Knowledge) is true or to refer back to principles like (Inferential Stakes) or 
(Entailed Stakes). Hence, we get right back into the initial contradiction.20 
                                                
19 It is only plausible in special cases of first—person attributions; see Montminy and Skolits 2014, 
325. 
20 Reductionists about testimony (see, amongst many, Fricker 1987) might protest here. According 
to them, one can only acquire knowledge of p through testimony if one has independent 
knowledge of the trustworthiness of the testifier or the reliability of the testimony (anti—
reductionists about testimony deny all this). According to this idea, Stanley would need prior and 
independent knowledge of the trustworthiness of the testifier or the reliability of the testimony. 
And this latter knowledge he might lack in his high—stakes situation. This counter—reply faces 
three problems. First, even if reductionism is true and the subject needs independent knowledge 
of the trustworthiness of the testifier or the reliability of the testimony, this still does not establish 
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Could a principle weaker than (Independent Knowledge) help the defender of SSI 
at this point? Consider 
 
(Counter—KK) For all subjects A and B and all propositions p: If A knows that B knows 
that p, then A knows that p. 
 
(Counter—KK) follows from and does not entail (Independent Knowledge) which is a 
special case of (Counter—KK).  
If (Counter—KK) is true, then it seems that the defender of SSI can use it in order 
to reject (3) (Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town). 
Using modus tollens, they can argue that since Stanley does not know that the train will 
stop at T—town, he also does not know that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at 
T—town.  
But is (Counter—KK) true? A’s knowledge that p is either 
 
(i) prior to and independent from (not based on) the knowledge that B knows that p, 
 
or 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
that the subject also needs independent knowledge of the testified content. Second and apart 
from that, this counter—reply would help to defend a general account of knowledge by using a 
very specific view about a particular source of knowledge; this, however, seems to get the cart 
before the horse. Third and related to the last point, anti—reductionism is a controversial view 
about testimony and it does not seem wise to add such burdens of proof to one’s case for SSI. 
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(ii) not prior to or independent from (not based on) the knowledge that B knows that p. 
 
Given the argument against (Independent Knowledge above), we can leave (i) aside 
here. This leaves us with (ii). If the defender does not want to present the question—
begging argument discussed above (section 2), then they could only have in mind the 
case where A’s knowledge that p is based (typically: inferentially) on A’s knowledge that 
B knows that p. Section 8 below will reject this option, and I refer the reader to that later 
section. So, both (Independent Knowledge) and (Counter—KK) are false. Our problem 
for SSI remains on the table.  
 
6. Troubling Implications: Blindspots 
No matter whether one goes with the first, second or third strategy of defending SSI 
(sections 3—5), there are further problems with the idea that Stanley does not know (1) 
(Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town) because he lacks knowledge of 
The train will stop at T—town. These problems have to do with the implications the 
acceptance of (6) (Stanley does not know that / whether Hawthorne knows that the train 
will stop at T—town) would have for SSI. Here is a first one:  
 
(Blindspot) For all subjects A and B and all propositions p: If A is in a high—stakes 
situation such that A does not know that p, and B is in a low—stakes situation such that 
B knows that p, then A does not know that B knows that p. 
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We can assume that the antecedent of (Blindspot) is quite often true. According to SSI, 
there would then be lots of quite simple truths about the knowledge of other people of 
which we would quite often have no knowledge. This is a serious limitation. 
Furthermore, people usually hold that they don’t suffer from this kind of epistemic limits 
(“Perhaps the threat of a Cartesian demon is a problem but not this!”). If that is so, the 
adherent of SSI would also have to add some plausible error theory which explains why 
subjects can get things so wrong so often. This is not an attractive situation for theorists 
(like the typical SSIists) who like to avoid attributing systematic error to subjects. 
One could object that the antecedent (Blindspot) is not that often true: only when 
A finds themselves in extraordinary situations of considerably high stakes. But this, the 
objection would continue, does not happen that often. In response one should stress 
that high—stakes situations do not have to be situations of extraordinarily high stakes. 
All that is needed for (Blindspot) to be true is that A's stakes are higher than B's such 
that B knows that p whereas A does not know that p. Lacking an argument for the 
implausible assumption that rarely the stakes differ significantly for different subjects in 
a given situation, the remarks just made are support for the claim that (Blindspot) will be 
true quite often, given SSI.  
Unsurprisingly, the situation is additionally embarrassing for the adherent of SSI. 
Stanley can reflect on all the above. If he does, he will have to admit that 
 
(7) I don’t know whether Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town but if I 
simply switch to a low—stakes situation I might well know that. 
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This is a well—known problem for SSI and looks like an abominable conjunction21 and 
perhaps even paradoxical.22 
 
7. More Troubling Implications: What to Think about Hawthorne? 
There is another worrisome implication of the above defences of (6) (Stanley does not 
know that / whether Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town) and SSI worth 
mentioning here. What should Stanley believe about Hawthorne’s epistemic state, 
according to SSI? Should he believe (1) or its negation or, perhaps suspend belief? If 
Stanley believes that  
 
(1) Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town,  
 
then he should also, given normal inferential abilities and knowledge of (Factivity), 
believe that 
 
(8) The train will stop at T—town.  
 
But how can Stanley believe this if at the same time he, given his high stakes, cannot 
commit to a view about whether the train will stop at T—town? And how can SSI 
recommend that Stanley believe something he doesn’t know, according to SSI? Given 
Stanley’s adherence to SSI, he would have to accept something Moore—paradoxical: 
                                                
21 See DeRose 1995. 
22 See also Blome—Tillmann 2009 for a similar problem with temporal and modal embeddings. 
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(9) The train will stop at T—town but I don’t know that and I don’t even believe that. 
 
Should Stanley then rather believe that not (1)? Should he (falsely) believe that 
 
(10) Hawthorne does not know that the train will stop at T—town?  
 
Well, if we also grant – which seems plausible, given our little scenario—that Stanley 
knows that 
 
(11) If the train will stop at T—town, then Hawthorne knows it, 
 
then Stanley could easily infer from (10) and (11) that 
 
(12) The train will not stop at T—town, 
 
which is false. But recommending to believe something which entails something false, is 
not good advice. So, SSI should rather not recommend that Stanley believe the 
negation of (1) (Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town).  
The final option is suspension of belief about whether Hawthorne knows that the 
train stops at T—town. At the same time, Stanley should, taking SSI to heart, deny that 
he himself knows that / whether the train stops at T—town. But why suspension of 
judgment in Hawthorne’s case when there is denial of knowledge in his own case? 
 23 
Stanley would be conceding the epistemic possibility that Hawthorne ‘might’ know that 
the train will stop at T—town. Stanley would then hold that the question whether the 
train will stop at T—town is not settled for himself but that it might be settled for 
Hawthorne, even though they both share the same evidence. It is very doubtful that 
Stanley could coherently make sense of this situation.  
More importantly, if Stanley believes that the question might be settled for 
Hawthorne, it would be rational or at least not unreasonable for him to just ask 
Hawthorne whether he knows whether the train will stop at T—town.23 Suppose he does 
so and suppose Hawthorne answers (correctly, according to SSI) that he does know 
that the train will stop at T—town. Suppose Stanley trusts Hawthorne’s epistemic 
conscientiousness. Would he have any reason to reject Hawthorne’s view or continue 
suspending judgment about it? What reason could that be? Perhaps that Hawthorne 
has lower stakes? But Stanley, the SSIist, could agree that it is possible that Hawthorne 
in his lower—stakes situation knows things he, Stanley, does not know. And if the 
conscientious fellow SSIist Hawthorne judges that he does know, how then could he, 
Stanley, doubt and suspend judgment about Hawthorne’s claim? It is not irrational or 
unreasonable and certainly conceivable that Stanley would accept Hawthorne’s claim 
and thus come not to suspend belief about Hawthorne’s epistemic state and acquire a 
belief about it—which gets us back into the problems above. 
                                                
23 Does this assumption change the case significantly because Hawthorne and Stanley now share a 
conversational context – which might affect their respective stakes? I don’t think so but if one had 
this worry, one could easily change the case in such a way that the alleged problem disappears 
(e.g., by assuming that another passengers tells Stanley that Hawthorne knows that there will be 
a stop at T—town).  
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If all this is true, then SSI has no good advice at all to offer about the question 
what Stanley should think about Hawthorne’s epistemic state. SSI does not offer an 
answer to an important normative question: What should a subject with higher stakes 
think about the epistemic situation of a subject with lower stakes? 
 
8. A Last Resort: Epistemic Dynamics 
The defender of SSI could finally, as a last resort, embrace a very different strategy: 
deny (6) (Stanley does not know that / whether Hawthorne knows that the train will stop 
at T—town), accept (3) (Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at 
T—town) and give a ‘dynamic diagnosis’ of the case.24 According to this idea, the 
argument needs to be modified slightly by adding a time—index. Here is the modified 
version (with t—2 being later than t—1). We have:  
 
(1—t) Hawthorne knows at t—1 (and later) that the train will stop at T—town, 
 
(2—t) Stanley doesn’t know at t—1 that (whether) the train will stop at T—town, 
 
(3—t) Stanley knows at t—1 (and later) that Hawthorne knows at t—1 (and later) that 
the train will stop at T—town, and 
 
(4—t) Stanley knows at t—1 (and later) that if Hawthorne knows at t—1 (and later) that 
the train will stop at T—town, then it will stop at T—town. 
                                                
24 See also Brueckner and Buford 2009. 
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From 
 
(Closure—t) For all subjects S and all propositions p and q: If S knows at t—1 (and 
later) that p, also knows at t—1 (and later) that (p → q), and comes to believe at t—2, 
on the basis of competent deduction from the above two propositions, that q, then S 
knows at t—2 that q 
 
plus (3—t) and (4—t) we can infer that 
 
(5—t) Stanley knows at t—2 that the train will stop at T—town. 
 
Stanley can come to know at t—2 that (1—t) is true even if he did not know that at t—1. 
Problem solved? Contradiction gone? 
Not quite! If The train will stop at t—town is a high—stakes proposition for 
Stanley at t—1, then also at t—2. The fact that Stanley can make a competent inference 
from what he knows to The train will stop at t—town does not change the stakes for The 
train will stop at t—town. How could it, given the arguments above? The proposition 
Hawthorne knows at t—1 (and later) that the train will stop at T—town can be low—
stakes for Stanley while The train will stop at T—town is high—stakes for him. But if The 
train will stop at T—town is still high—stakes for Stanley, then SSI lacks the resources 
to solve the inconsistency problem by giving a dynamical diagnosis of the situation. 
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9. Conclusion 
The prospects for successfully defending (6) (Stanley does not know that / whether 
Hawthorne knows that the train will stop at T—town) seem very bleak. We should thus 
give up (6) and stick with (3): Stanley knows that Hawthorne knows that the train will 
stop at T—town. It appears to be an epistemological truism that barring very special 
circumstances a person can often know that another person knows a given proposition. 
A theory which denies or severely restricts this plausible principle has the burden of 
proof on its side and needs to come up with strong arguments against it (here against 
(3)). I have, on behalf of SSI, tried all serious arguments against (3) I could think of but 
they all fail. It is not just that SSI has its own problems – which theory hasn’t got 
problems? The problems rather seem so serious that we should look for alternatives. 
However, if the SSIist does not give up (3) and continues to adhere to factivity and 
closure, then it is hard to see how they can avoid falling into the contradiction derived in 
section 1. Something has to go and it’s SSI.  
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